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This thesis contains the result of a study of the compu-
ter security/privacy problem. The primary purpose is to pre-
sent the fundamental issues of computer security in survey
form. Various protection schemes and administrative techni-
ques are examined and related to security programs. Problems
in the development of secure systems for the future are
appreciated, and approaches for secure interim programs are
suggested. This paper is directed at data processing mana-
gers with the goal of helping them better understand the vul-
nerability of data in computers . It is intended to foster a




I. INTRODUCTION ------------------- 7
A. OBJECTIVES ------------------ ]_
B. SCOPE- -------------------- n
II. COMPUTER CRIME AND ABUSES- ------------ 13
A. THE COMPUTER CRIMINAL- ------------ 13
B. SOME FACTS AND STATISTICS- ---------- 14
C. A SURVEY OF COMPUTER CRIMES- --------- 15
D. CAUSES OF COMPUTER CRIME ----------- 17
III. THE PRIVACY ISSUE- ---------------- 19
A. LEGAL BASIS OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY- ----- 22
B. THE PRIVACY ACT- --------------- 24
C. THE PRIVACY PROBLEM IN PERSPECTIVE ------ 26
IV. THE DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING PROBLEM -------- 28
V. PHYSICAL SECURITY- ---------------- 34
A. HARDWARE FAILURES- -------------- 35
1. -Backup File- --------------- 35
B. NATURAL DISASTERS- -------------- 35
1. Recovery Plan- -------------- 35
2. Redundancy ---------------- 37
C. CONTROL OF DOCUMENTATION ----------- 37
D. ACCESS CONTROL ---------------- 38
E. SUPERVISING PHYSICAL SECURITY- -------- 38
VI. PERSONNEL SECURITY AND EDUCATION --------- 40
VII. SOFTWARE SECURITY- ---------------- 45
A. SOFTWARE SECURITY WEAKNESSES --------- 46
B. OPERATING SYSTEMS- -------------- 49
5

C. SOFTWARE SECURITY MEASURES ---------- 50
D. CHECKPOINTS AND JOURNALS ----------- 51
E. MEASURING SOFTWARE PERFORMANCE -------- 52
F. SOFTWARE SECURITY CONTROL SYSTEMS- ------ 53
G. SUMMARY- ------------------- 55
VIII. ELECTROMAGNETIC SECURITY ------------- 55
IX. CRYPTOGRAPHY -------.------------ 53
X. MANAGEMENT AND SECURITY- ------------- 68
A. THE COMPUTER SECURITY MANAGER- -------- 70
XI. RISK ANALYSIS- ------------------ 73
XII. DATA PROCESSING AUDITING ------------- 8
XIII. INSURANCE- -------------------- g2
XIV. CONCLUDING REMARKS ---------------- 85
LIST OF REFERENCES- ------------------- 89
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ---------------- 93

I. INTRODUCTION
Managers are becoming increasingly concerned with issues
of computer security and privacy. There is growing awareness
among computer users of the vulnerability of their data and
the potential cost of its loss. Managers are now aware that
information is a unique asset that can be stolen even though
it may never be missed. /Ref. 10/ The computer has provided
for industrial growth and new applications to the extent that
the majority of large organizations can now only function for
a matter of a few hours without the proper functioning of their
computer. The computer has made it possible to store, retrive,
and to manipulate data to an extent not thought possible a few
years ago. This has increased the scope of data processing
applications into new areas. This increased scope has brought
with it increased security problems . We must now come to grips
with the security problem and find a solution through common
sense management and further research in hardware and software
applications
.
Security involves the hardware manufacturer, the software
developer, and user; and encompasses physical facilities and
operational procedures, as well as programming techniques.
/Ref. 16/ Computer security requires the protection of sys-
tem associated physical assets, facilities, and processed data
and programs. It involves the protection of data against
accidental or intentional disclosure to unauthorized persons,

or unauthorized modifications or destruction. Of particular
interest are the data processing hardware, software, people,
storage media, input/output areas, communications terminals
and transmission paths.
System security was neglected in early designs and develop-
ment of computers. Initially the prime objectives of system
manufacturers was to make it work and to find new applications,
As computer usage expanded into government and industry, it
soon became obvious that adequate protection was not provided
for processed data. Federal laws requiring the protection of
national security information were strengthened and new laws
were passed to protect the privacy of individuals. Economic
considerations and common sense soon dictated that industry
join government in demanding more secure systems.
The U. S. Government is now spending over $10 billion
annually for the operation of computer-based information sys-
tems. /Ref. 9/ Public interest has the right to expect
government to do everything possible to maximize economy and
manage the information systems effectively from a security/
privacy point of view. Yet, top management has failed to
exercise leadership to focus information technology applica-
tions toward attainment of specific objectives. Specifically
there has been no policy guidance on the need for detailed
program analysis and program operation. For these reasons
much of the potential power of information technology still
remains at a primitive level of application.

Federal, state, and local governments are proposing and
passing security and privacy legislation. The new laws re-
strict the manner in which information about individuals can
be collected, stored, and disseminated. In addition, much of
this legislation dictates that certain security safeguards be
implemented by the computer user. For example, national laws
now apply not only to paper in filing cabinets, but also to
data in the computer.
The vulnerability and increased use of computer systems
has led to an increasing number of security incidents. The
failures that have always resulted in security problems in
manual data systems are the ones present in automatic data
processing systems: errors, omissions, floods, fires, explo-
sions, frauds, thefts, extortions, vandalisms, larceny, ex-
pionage, and compromises of personal rights.
The problem of security of information has been with the
world since the first bit of information was processed. Stored
or transmitted information has been subject to destruction by
natural disasters and interception by man from the beginning.
The computer has only made it possible to manipulate larger
amounts of data and in that way it has expanded and compounded
the security problem. Certainly, the invention of the computer
has led to a serious problem for the public, a threat to their
security and privacy. In his book, Future Shock , Alvan Toffler
says, "we have scarcely touched on the computer revolution and
the far-remifying changes that must follow in its churning
wake". /Ref. 4 5/

A. OBJECTIVES
The objectives of this thesis are to present the main
issues of computer security and to enhance an appreciation of
the problems involved. The fundamental elements of computer
security problems applicatable to both government and private
business will be examined. This is a study of computer secur-
ity problems confronting the data processing manager. It is
intended to impress upon the reader the seriousness of the
computer security problem in hopes of preventing future secur-
ity violations. This paper is not intended to be technical
or to describe all of the protection schemes which have been
proposed and/or implemented, but to describe the data proces-
sing security situation.
Of particular interest to computer security is the impact
of the Privacy Act of 1974. Computer security has only re-
cently been recognized as a major problem in data processing,
and security considerations have seriously lagged behind tech-
nical developments. Much work remains before the level of
security in data processing is improved to an acceptable level
under current laws. Part of the computer security problem is
technical in nature, i.e. cryptology and system design, but
the major portion of the problem is administrative. Proper
system design and the use of cryptology will minimize the
necessary administrative controls, but future technical inno-
vation alone will not resolve the problem no more than past
technical advances have lessoned the administrative burden.
Basically, computer security will remain an administrative/
educational problem. /Ref. 5 0/
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Therefore, management must be ready to look at computer
security in a comprehensive manner. Data processing managers
must understand the vulnerability of data that is stored in
computer systems. Hopefully, this thesis will make a contri-
bution toward that goal. Methods of protecting data are more
varied than data processing systems: however, some methods of
protecting against accidental or deliberate loss are just
common sense. Based on the premise that the best way to begin
preventing computer abuses is to understand how they happen,
typical computer crimes are examined.
Primary concerns are to understand the problem, examine
approaches toward development of a secure system, suggest
methods of providing protection by a security program, and
appreciating planning and development problems.
A secondary objective of this thesis is to provide the
basis for a follow-on thesis in the form of a training film.
The envisioned film would be designed to foster a sense of
security awareness among military data processing managers
and supervisors.
B. SCOPE
It is recognized that the scope of this thesis is quite
wide. Either of the primary chapters could have served as an
adequate subject by itself for thesis research. However, from
a security managment point of view, an effective data pro-
cessing security program cannot be built on just physical
security or cryptology alone. An effective data processing
security program will require a unique mix of all the subject
11

areas covered in this thesis. Each program must be tailored
to the specific needs and requirements of the organization for
which it is designed.
To understand the problem, it is necessary to be aware of
the information presented in the chapter on computer crimes and
abuses. A manager must know the problem before he can provide
a solution.
The chapter on privacy leaves little doubt as to the seri-
ousness of the problem. The legal and social implication of
data processing security/privacy simply must be understood by
anyone in charge of a computer facility today. Current laws
place the ethical and legal responsibility for security clearly
with the data processing manager. The rapid expansion of the
use of computers via the distributed processing concept com-
pounds the data processing manager's security problem. He must
call upon a wide variety of administrative and technical skills
to manage a balanced and comprehensive security program. For
this reason, it is necessary to include chapters on both tech-
nical and administrative procedures.
The scope of the problem today is too wide to be delt with
by just personnel and physical security procedures, and a se-
curity program built solely on technical application cannot
be effective. The manager involved with data processing today
must understand all the technical and administrative implica-
tions of electromagnetic phenomena, software, personnel and
cryptology. He must know how to manage by such techniques as




II. COMPUTER CRIME AND ABUSES
In the United States between one and two billion dollars a
year is lost because of employee theft of goods, and another
three billion is lost by embezzlement. An additional five
million is lost to industrial espionage, and much more is lost
to information thievery. No one knows how many cases of com-
puter abuse and invasion of privacy and confidentiality have
been perpetrated, but Anderson and Company, a CPA firm, esti-
mates that losses from computer crime will exceed 2 billion
dollars per year by 19 82. /Ref. 31_/ Known computer-related
fraud losses in 1974 amounted to $200 million and it has been
estimated that this represents only 15% of the actual fraud
which occurred during that year. Commercial banks alone
handle over 100 million transactions each business day. These
transactions involve 100 million separate accounts in over
14,000 institutions and are of the order to $120 billion.
A. THE COMPUTER CRIMINAL
The Stanford Research Institute indicates that 66% of the
total human threat to computer installations is comprised of
data processing personnel employed by the victim organization.
Research has also produced the individual profile: /Ref. 41/
1. Highly skilled
2. 18-30 year old male
3. Bright, eager, and highly motivated
13

4. Exhibits the Robin Hood Syndrome




7. Great fear of detection and exposure
A clever programmer can introduce into a coded procedure
subtle changes that lie hidden and dormant, perhaps for months;
these changes are then triggered by an external event, such as
the disappearance of the programmer's name from the payroll.
The more skillful and knowledgeable the person, the more
dangerous he becomes if his actions and intent are directed
against the organization. One should assume the potential
attacker will know as much about the system and its security
features as its designers. For someone skilled in the art,
penetrating an operating system takes little more effort than
solving a difficult crossword puzzle, and it can be consi-
derably more lucrative. Computerized larceny has several
advantages over regular old style larceny. Computerized
larceny is seldom discovered and is difficult to prosecute
when it is discovered. Computer criminals are seldom pro-
fessional criminals, but they are usually much more successful.
They obtain much more money than other criminals and are sel-
com caught.
B. SOME FACTS AND STATISTICS
Much of our knowledge is based on the findings of a Stan-
ford Research Study of 129 computer related incidents of loss,
injury, or damage. /Ref. 367 Of these, 24 involved vandalism,
41 information or property theft, 43 financial fraud or theft,
14

and 21 unauthorized use or sale of services. Incidents ranged
from stealing flowcharts from waste baskets, to penetration of
the operating system for purposes of industrial espionage.
In two cases computers were actually shot with pistols . It can
be concluded from the study that security measures within a
computer system at the present stage of development can be only
as effective as the physical and personnel security surrounding
the system.
Embezzlements with the aid of computers are for approxima-
tely ten times larger amounts than without the aide of compu-
ters. Theft of property with the aide of computers has also
been much higher in value than without the assistance of com-
puters .
C. A SURVEY OF COMPUTER CRIMES
The most recent publicized computer crime involved the
theft of $10.2 million in bank funds. A computer consultant
working alone transferred the money from San Diego via New
York to Switzerland and on to a Soviet diamond compnay. The
money was used to buy $13 million worth of diamonds. For-
tunately for the bank, the diamonds were recovered and became
bank property, and the bank made a tidy $3 million profit.
The first programmer convicted for stealing programs was
in 1964 and he received a sentence of five years imprisonment
for apparently turning over his employer's proprietary com-
puter program to an outsider. The first federal computer
criminal case occurred in 1966 when a 21 year old programmer
put a patch on the demand deposit accounting program he
15

developed to make it ignore overdrafts on his own checking
account.
Some typical computer crimes and abuses follow:
1. An employee of the Encyclopedia Britannica was able
to walk off with a tape in his briefcase, containing a custo-
mer list. He used a service bureau to duplicate the list for
sale.
2. An antiwar group destroyed data processing media using
magnets, reconstruction costs were $100,000.
3. An Army data center was bombed by dissidents causing
$1.5 million damage, loss of one researcher and a 20 year data
base. /Ref. 4/
4. A disgruntled Army officer awaiting retirement erased
purchasing data from magnetic tape.
5. A Department of Defense executive bribed a Pentagon
data processing employee to do computer work for a foreign
interest.
6. Hidden wireless transmitters were found inside a com-
puter processor unit in a U. S. security agency office.
7. Typical of the threat of privacy breaches in data
security is the case of a G. I. who had just returned from the
Vietnamese war and was offered $10,000 by organized crime to
become a contract killer. /Ref. 4 8/ Someone had gotton hold
of his army record and found that he had been involved in
several "kills" in Viet Nam. Similar problems exist through-
out the data field where information is compiled on individuals.
16

The foregoing are only examples of an infinite number of
ways the computer system can be abused. As illustrated by the
examples, most criminal uses of computers are by individuals,
but organized crime has not overlooked the possibility of large
easy profits through the use of computerized embezzlement. In
1968, a Diners* Club credit card company lost over $1,000,000
in a credit card fraud. A computer printout of real Diners'
Club customers was used to make phony credit cards; when dis-
covered over 3,000 cards had been used for the safe 30-day
period before the real customers complained about their bills.
This was traced to an interstate crime organization in New
York and Florida.
D. CAUSES OF COMPUTER CRIME
Computer crime cases investigated or reported show some
causes worthy of highlighting. Crimes and abuses in the data
security area show the following five general conditions that
allowed the crimes to take place.
1. Almost all of the crimes and abuses studied could have
been prevented with better manual procedures and internal con-
trols .
2. Most computer crimes or abuses were discovered by acci-
dent .
3. The cost of crimes involving computer systems appeared
to run much higher than in those involving manual systems.
4. Most computer crimes are not reported and, therefore,




5. Audit trails through a computer process are generally
lacking; it is possible to steal one's way to fortune, using
a computer to extract nickels and dimes from many accounts
,
the differences being unoticeable to the individuals affected.
Several criteria indicate that the climate for computer
crime is good but becoming better. Some companies even fail
to use an independent audit and computer installations have a
tendency to cause more and more of the checking and balancing
to be done within the computer department itself. Physical
handling of assets, recording of transactions, and supervision
are actions which should be independent of each other. Em-
bezzlement often occurs because one individual has complete
authority over an asset with no checks. Dual control or sim-
ply rotation of duties will minimize the opportunities in many
cases. /Ref. 4 0_7
If better protection measures for computer information are
not developed, past computer crimes will be minor in compari-
son to new crimes that are likely to take place. The future
looks good for a criminal who specializes in manipulating or
stealing computer information or the ameteur who wants to
start out in this field.
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III. THE PRIVACY ISSUE
Privacy is the right of individuals to control the collec-
tion, use and dissemination of personal identifiable informa-
tion: to determine what information about themselves is made
available to whom and to what extent. In another context, the
meaning of privacy is the right to be left alone.
The threat to the individual is loss of anonymity, fear of
minor exposure, and fear of de-personalization of social values
The fear of erroneous treatment, the fear of unfair treatment
and the fear of hostile treatment are all part of the computer/
privacy problem.
There is an atmosphere in both industry and government to-
day that seems to exist in which the individual in exchange
for benefit or service is assumed to waive all interest and
control over the information collection, storage, and dissemi-
nation. From privileged files, such as retirement records, or
financial records, some users compile mailing lists to sell,
or even sell proprietary data to competing contractors, and
personnel information may be stolen for illegal purposes such
as blackmail.
Potentially the Social Security Number could become a
standard universal identifier of American citizens. It could
be used to track all the errors, omissions, and/or sins of an
individual from cradle to grave. /Ref. 4 8_7 The record keepers
in the federal government already know more about us than we
19

know about ourselves. The list is enormous as indicated by
Bottlieb and Borodin in their book, Social Issues in Computing .
/Ref. 127
Their list of the following types of data commonly gathered
about individuals is indicative of the privacy threat from com-
puter listings.
1. Identification:
Name, maiden name (if applicable) , social insurance
number, date of birth, place of birth, citizenship, address,





Occupation, current employer, employment history,
earnings, education and training, qualifications.
3. Medical:
Current health, medical description and history, gene-
tic factors, reportable diseases, x-rays, immunizations, dental
history, health, plan and participation.
4. Education:
Schools attended, educational attainments, professional
licenses, awards, loans.
5. Taxation:
Earnings, investment income, foreign holdings, depen-
dents .
6. Financial:
Bank account history, holdings, earnings, credit and




Rank and qualifications, service record, disciplinary
record, medical record.
8. Vehicle registration:
Owner, property identification, description, zoning,
assessment and taxation, uses.
9. License and permits:
Identification, type of license, dates, insurance.
10. Travel:




Agency, history, dependents, aid received, earnings.
12. Civil action:
History, court identification, dates, outcomes.
13. Police records:
Offenses, warrants, convictions, confinements, proba-





Company, sales history, credit status.
15. Life Insurance:




Type, source, customer profile, history of purchases.
17. Biographical:





Organization, history, participation, financial,
relatives.
Record keeping has gone on since the Stone Age /Ref. 4 8/
but record keeping techniques have grown to keep pace with
the sophisticated ways of data gathering, and the incessantly
increasing demand for data. The Federal Government has at
least twenty-seven agencies and bureaus gathering information,
much of which is quite private and personal. /Ref. 16/ In
June of 1974, the results of a study by the staff of the
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights was re-
leased. /Ref. 207 This study showed the scope of the federal
government's collection of personal data on individuals: "the
study found 858 data banks in 54 federal agencies, the majority
of them not legislatively authorized"
.
A. LEGAL BASIS OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The proliferation of information systems containing per-
sonally identifiable information has made it necessary to pass
statutory laws in the United States to protect the privacy of
individuals. The issue of computers and privacy first came
to a head in 1966 when the Federal Bureau of the Budget pro-
posed a Federal Data Center. The public and congress saw this
as a central file of dossiers, too centralized and too access-
ible. The government would have a much too powerful tool for
controlling its subjects. The idea was dropped. In 1969
Congress passed the Fair Credit Reporting Act. This act was
22

clearly aimed at the credit bureau's ability to produce a
dossier on all the citizens in the United States. The fear
of a "suffocating sense of surveillance", and a growing dis-
trust of too much government are both natural concommitants
of computer data banks.
The concept of personal privacy and individual rights is
really as old and as basic as our Bill of Rights. Most Ameri-
cans accept it as the bedrock of their freedom and give it
little concern. That is, until they find how insidiously
their privacy is being invaded or their rights ignored. The
constitution of the United States doesn't mention a right to
privacy explicitely, only three state constitutions do:
Alaska, California and South Carolina. However, personal pri-
vacy derives some protection from judicial interpretation of
some provisions of the Bill of Rights.
In the law history of the United States, privacy had its
beginning in approximately 1890 in a Law Review published by
Louis D. Brandeis, later to become a Justice of the Supreme
Court. /Ref. 16/ He developed the history of the Right of
Privacy and strongly suggested the direction of its applica-
tion. /Ref. 1/ In Griswold vs. Connecticut (1965), the
Supreme Court clearly indicated that the Ninth Amendment con-
tained the right to privacy. The Ninth Amendment provides
that "the enumeration of the Constitution of certain rights
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
by the people" . The Supreme Court held that one of those
rights not mentioned in the Bill of Rights and which was
23

retained by the people was the right to privacy.
The concept of privacy has its origin in early English
common law cases which provided that individuals had a certain
right not to have facts about their personal life publicized.
The original cases involved excesses of the press in publish-
ing information about individuals which caused an unjustifiable
infliction of mental pain and distress.
B. THE PRIVACY ACT
"Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens", a report
prepared for the Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
and published in July 1973, gave impetus to the current con-
cern over infringement on individual privacy caused by the
leaking of personal data, which in turn gave impetus to the
passage of the Privacy Act of 1974. Although the Privacy Act
was aimed primarily at federal agencies, it established a Pri-
vacy Protection Study commission which can affect the private
sector. In any event the Privacy Act, (Public Law 93-579)
,
Section 552a lists certain responsibilities management must
fulfill. In short, the first responsibility is to determine
if a system of records are covered under the Privacy Act. If
so, applicable protection requirements must be met.
The Primary purpose of the Act was to lay down specific
guidelines for all federal offices which keep information or
files on any individual. /Ref. 20/ Generally the Act pro-
tects individuals against information handling practices
that may cause harm or embarrassment. The Act provides for a
$5,000 fine for anyone not complying with the provisions of
24

the Act, and also allows anyone harmed to sue the person who
violates the Act.
Public Law 93-579 amends Chapter 5 of Title 5 of the United
States Code. It applies to United States Federal Government
Agencies and private contractors who are performing a record-
keeping service for a Federal Agency.
Public Law 93-579 created a set of standards for the collec-
tion, maintenance, use and dissemination of personal informa-
tion in both manual and automated systems . A Code of Fair In-
formation Practices are incorporated into the Privacy Act. The
basic principles are abbreviated below:
1. There must be no personal data record-keeping system
whose very existence is secret.
2. There must be a way for an individual to find out what
information about him is in a record and how it is used.
3. There must be a way for an individual to prevent in-
formation about him that was obtained for one purpose from
being used or made available for another purpose without his
consent
.
4. There must be a way for an individual to correct or
amend a record of identifiable information about him.
5. Any organization creating, maintaining, using or dis-
seminating records of identifiable personal data must assure
the reliability of the data for thier intended use and must
take precautions to prevent misuse of the data.
These principles incorporated in the Privacy Act (Section
552b) permit exceptions when "determined by specific statutory
25

authority" . Legislating the right to privacy must be balanced
against equally valid public interests in freedom of informa-
tion, national defense, foreign policy and law enforcement.
The technical problem of protecting data in a computer
system is the same whether national security or personal pri-
vacy is involved. In the Navy we must be concerned with both
problems. Automated medical systems fall strictly under the
Privacy Act, automatic command and control systems ususally do
not involve privacy but often require protection of nationally
classified information. Intelligence systems may involve both
security and privacy protection. The Navy is required to sat-
isfy the Congress that certain considerations have been met
with respect to the Privacy Act for all systems. This res-
ponsibility lies strictly with data processing management. Cen-
tral to the privacy issue is computer security, for privacy can
be guaranteed only if computer security is complete. Without
computer security, promises of privacy can be easily violated.
C. THE PRIVACY PROBLEM IN PERSPECTIVE
Key information issues identified by the Domestic Council
Committee on the Right of Privacy identifies at least a dozen
major considerations: /Ref. 2 5/
1. the true needs of information
2. inter-agency information sharing
3. freedom on information
4. information as property




7. federal policy laws
8. rational information policy and legislation
9. government R&D for information
10. trans-border information flow
11. technology transfer by information
12. media technology
These key issues only begin to describe the complexity of
the data processing world where interwoven action in one area
impacts all or most of the others. National policy must be
strong enough to answer questions such as who will control
electronic mail, electronic funds transfer, telecommunications,
freedom of information, privacy as well as other issues. If
not, the results will be inefficient, ineffective, and most
likely catastrophic.
The complete fear associated with the privacy problem was
eloquently summed up by the statement by Justice Brandeis in
the 192 8 case of Olmstead versus the United States: /Ref. 48/
"Experience should teach us to be most on our
guard to protect liberty when the Government's
purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are
naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty
by evil-minded rulers . The greatest dangers to
liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of
zeal, well-meaning, but without understanding."
27

IV. THE DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING PROBLEM
The concept of distributed processing systems is rapidly
gaining universal acceptance; however, it is not clearly un-
derstood. A standard definition of distributed processing has
not yet gained wide acceptance. Current literature contains
numerous examples of interchanging the concepts of "network"
and "distributed processing systems". Even in context, it is
difficult to discern exactly which phrase is the proper choice
Because of the anticipated future significance of distri-
buted processing, two workshops were conducted at Brown Uni-
versity during 1976 and 1977. The conferences were convened
to develop insight into the implications of distributed pro-
cessing, and to attempt to define the term itself. The con-
ferences proposed a definition that includes five separate
facets
:
1. A multiplicity of general purpose components that can
be dynamically assigned specific tasks.
2. A physical distribution of the physical and logical
components using a communications network.
3. A high-level operating system that integrates and con-
trols ail of the distributed components.
4. System transparency, meaning that a user can request
and receive a service without knowing or caring from where
the service is being provided.
5. Cooperative autonomy, meaning essentially that
28

processors in the distributed system cooperate on a co-equal
protocol basis. The general opinion formed during the afore-
mentioned converences was that a distributed system has all
five features, yet only the communications subsystem of the
ARPANET presently meets all of the criteria.
The design and implementation of a security program for
a distributed processing system is a data processing manager's
nightmare. Security in a distributed system can only be as
strong as the security at every node in the system, a breach
of security at one site can conceivably impact upon one or
more other sites in the system. Achieving security in compu-
ter networks is a far greater challenge than achieving it in
stand-alone systems. Security in a distributed system demands
all the considerations given to security in a centralized sys-
tem, plus many additional considerations.
Remote terminals and multiple processors are the single
greatest problems and complicating factor in data processing
security. Remote access to computers has resulted in an ex-
panded user population and terminals which are placed in loca-
tions potentially more hostile than the host environment.
Lack of administrative and operational controls over users at
the remote access terminals have accelerated this problem.
On-line or real time systems present special security pro-
blems. People interact with the programs and the memories
faster, data is available faster than in batch oriented sys-
tems, data is up to date, and data can be altered quickly.




1. Physical access to the computer cannot be isolated to
the environs of a machine room, thus complicating the physi-
cal security problem.
2. The communications lines are vulnerable to tapping or
passive monitoring of emanations. Crosstalk between communi-
cations lines or within the switching centrals can present a
vulnerability
.
3. In a networked system, a large population of users
with varying needs to know will be interacting simultaneously
with the system.
4. The more extensive the network, the greater the pro-
bability of system error and vulnerability to intrusion.
5
.
It is impossible to verify that any large software
system is completely free of errors and anomalies.
6. The remote location of a terminal introduces the pro-
blem of identification of the user of the system.
An interesting twist to the identification problem is the
requirement to have the computer properly identify itself to
the user. The potential need for such a scheme is best ex-
plained by the following situation. Several computer science
students wrote a program to simulate the normal log-in proce-
dure on a terminal. They left the terminal running, executing
the program. Prospective users would log in and authenticate
to the program, which filed that information. The program
would then simulate a system crash. That forces the users to
log back into the system, this time actually gaining access
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to the computer resources. In that manner, the students ob-
tained 100 user log-in precedures. The implications of this
sort of masquerade are obvious and illustrate the potential
requirement to have the computer identify itself to the satis-
faction of the user.
Abuses of on-line systems can be relatively easy for a
system not designed from the ground up to provide security.
For example, a large oil company's inspection of usage logs
revealed an unusually high rate of access to certain files for
which normal user's would have no need. Further investigations
revealed an ex-employee, in possession of all the correct pass-
words, was using his own terminal at home to dial through the
public phone system and drain off company financial data. His
motive was to gain inside financial information for playing
the stock market. There are various schemes to limit the
effectiveness of intruders. One such scheme was just demon-
strated, i.e. the user log. Each user is periodically pro-
vided information on his usage. If he did not in fact use the
system on all those occasions, his identity and authentication
have been compromised and must be changed.
A promising approach to access control is to use a mini-
computer as a means of authenticating and controlling access
to the system or its resources. The physical separation and
smaller operating system in the minicomputer would enhance
security because it would be easier to check for tampering and
it would be easier to control The employment of specialized
front-end processors for handling communication is desireable.
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It would be questionable practice to tie up large computers
for this and such tasks as encryption, decryption, and sending
and receiving.
One of the most complex problems that must be faced in the
design and implementation of distributed processing systems is
the problem of providing security for data in transmission.
All technical resources will be strained to assure security
over communication lines. The threat is the "bugging" of the
communication line and node linkages which are extremely vul-
nerable to attack. Messages going across lines can be read,
copied, altered, and duplicated. The equipment needed for
this infiltration is readily obtainable from any radio parts
supplier at little cost. Fortunately, this intrusion method
can be effectively countered by a high level encryption sys-
tem as explained in Chapter IX.
Once a communications line leaves a particular facility,
it is joined by scores, or even hundreds or thousands, of
unmarked lines. The transmission may even be multiplexed and
sent via microwave. The point is that wire-tapping or inter-
ception of data can be difficult after the transmission line
leaves the immediate area. Therefore, wire-tapping is most
likely to occur within the building housing either the ter-
minals or the receiving computer. The connection boxes at
those locations must be secured.
The first step toward achieving any kind of security in a
resource shared system is to apply those principles of protec-
tion that would normally be used in a local or one node system.
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If the basic principles of physical and administrative secur-
ity, as well as adequate audit trails and backup are followed,
then the necessary groundwork will have been laid for imple-
mentation of protection throughout the network.
Good security procedures are a viable philosophy that must
permeate all activities in managing data, hardware and soft-
ware. The concept of establishing and nurturing that positive
philosophy will go even farther in a distributed system. The
integration of geographically dispersed computer systems im-
plies the need for the concomitant requirements for data en-






Physical security is the most basic part of the security
program. Classified information on a computer must be pro-
tected just like classified information in more traditional
forms. However, the problems in protecting data in a computer
system are more subtle and more complex and cannot be solved
completely by a massive dose of cryptography. We also must
protect the computer systems as well as the data if we are to
prevent alteration, destruction or loss by sabotage and es-
pionage.
Problems in physical computer security are complicated by
the remote location of terminals, the increased amount of re-
source, and the presence of distributed intelligence, and
distributed data banks. All computer installations should be
a restricted area even if they don't deal with sensitive infor-
mation. Restricted access will serve as the front line of
defense. Structural integrity of the facility is an important
ingredient, not only for the hardware but for the libraries as
well. A less obvious safeguard is simply not to have large
signs proclaiming the location of the facility. However, the
factors of physical security such as site selection, fire and
damage control and access control will likely be delt with




To prevent hardware failures, it will be necessary to main-
tain a high level of hardware maintenance. A thorough and re-
gularly scheduled maintenance program should be designed to
keep hardware in top operating condition. Hardware failure
can cause serious losses to valuable data. For example, ser-
ious damage to files can result from any device mishandling
magnetic storage media such as tapes, disks, or drums. The
read/write heads on these devices should not physically touch
the media. If the head does touch the media, the surface of
the media, and of course the data contained thereon, will be
damaged along with the read/write head itself. Such an occur-
rence is known as a head crash. Strict adherence to good hand-
ling procedures and cleanliness can do much to prevent such
occurrences. The tolerances of the devices are so fine that
fingerprints and even small particles of dust or smoke can
cause damage to read/write heads and storage media.
1. Back-up Files/Hardware
Minimizing damage due to a hardware of software failure
can generally be accomplished by a back-up file. The concept
of retaining "father" and even "grandfather" files is a
widely accepted practice in data processing. Back-up pro-
cessors which are able to process in a degraded environment
minimizes the impact of a hardware failure. An organization's
efforts directed toward minimizing damage due to hardware or
software failure can generally enhance the recovery from such
a failure. As in so many cases, back-up capability in hardware




Acts of God include such threats as fire, flood, severe
weather, earthquakes and acts of war. Aside from fire protec-
tion, there is not a great deal that an organization can do to
prevent the occurrence of such destructive acts of God. /Ref
.
55/ An organization which is dependent on its computer sys-
tem can suffer a large financial loss and degraded capability
if that system is damaged or destroyed by intentional sabotage
or natural disaster. The publicity attendent on bombings of
computer installations has alerted many managers to that po-
tential danger. But fire, earthquakes, or hurricanes can be
almost or even more damaging and may be more likely to occur.
These things need to be evaluated and taken into account when
planning a security program.
Probably the biggest threat universally faced by computer
facilities is fire. A Pentagon fire in the early 1960 's des-
troyed $6.7 million worth of equipment and over 7,00 reels of
magnetic tape. A fire does not have to be in the machine room
to completely cripple the data processing operation. Fire can
deny air conditioning, or cause smoke damage if in an adjacent
space. Floods and natural disasters also should be considered
when planning the recovery phase.
1 . Recovery Plan
Too few systems have a usable disaster recovery pro-
cedure in the event of major destruction or sabotage. In
order to move quickly and efficiently into emergency opera-
tions, the back-up recovery plan should be prepared, published
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and rehearsed. The plan should be stored off-site. It should
contain an inventory of items essential to recovery, a list of
alternate resources of supply, and people to contact at the
supplier. The plan should be simple and flexible. It is more
important that the plan identify alternatives than give de-
tailed instruction. A written mutual assistance agreement
should be negotiated with a compatable installation. This
agreement should identify the amount of computer time to be
made available to a recipient as well as specifying the time
of day during which the time will be provided. This mutual
assistance agreement should be stored with the back-up/re-
covery plan.
2 . Redundancy
Recovery from damage due to acts of God can also be
greatly enhanced by reasonable redundance. Duplicate files
maintained on tapes or other magnetic media (or even cards)
should be stored with some separation from the main library.
Duplication would serve no purpose if one fire or flood would
destroy both the original file and the duplicate at the same
time. In considering duplication of extensive file systems,
the cost of such duplication must be weighed against both
the value of the data and the probability of destruction.
C. CONTROL OF DOCUMENTATION
Control of documentation is a major area of the overall
security program. Prevention of unauthorized copying is an
important aspect of documentation control. If possible,
paper which is resistant to photocopying equipment should be
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used. A better approach would be to use tape or micro-film
for the back-up copy. The program library must provide safe
storage as well as distribution control. The back-up copy
must be protected by the same measures used to protect the
most sensitive file copied.
Back-up program copies must be stored in vaults or fire
resistant cabinets. Copies must be updated regularly. Two
copies are best, one for immediate use in the installation and
one at some safe remote storage location. Positive inventory
and accounting procedures for both should be installed.
D. ACCESS CONTROL
If possible, personnel traffic should be limited to one
entrance where security is provided by a cypher lock or guard/
badge checking system. All visitors should be escorted when
in a restricted area and logged in and out in a visitors log.
The entrance should be within view of the normal working area.
How the installation is designed will influence how easy the
controlled access problem will be.
E. SUPERVISING PHYSICAL SECURITY
Data processing managers should take an intense personal
interest in daily informal observations. Make sure that bad
practices are not allowed to get started, and make sure pre-
scribed procedures are followed. Good physical security
practices can be negated by the lack of adequate supervision.
Be on the look out for such weaknessess as the company with
cipher locks guarding all doors to its computer installation
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and unlocked distribution boxes for the computer output in
a public- hallway , or worse yet unguarded access terminals.
/Ref . 54/ In one case a computer was used to steal more than
a million dollars and the information needed to crack the sys-





VI. PERSONNEL SECURITY AND EDUCATION
Computer security must be viewed as a multi-dimensional pro-
blem. Personnel security is unfortunately linked with physical
security in a manner that produces what has been labeled "the
fox in the chicken coup" problem. When the machine room doors
are locked, we are essentially locking in our personnel secur-
ity problems since, in batch processing, the people that we
have the most reason to fear are our own technical and opera-
tional personnel. /Ref. 48^/
College students today are supplied with computer time and
computer terminals for their academic pursuits. However, most
of the time-sharing systems and many of the campus computers
are unable to control the work submitted by a student on a
legitimate job number. Most schools don't even attempt to
control the work flowing through the center. /Ref. 54/ Thus
in addition to providing the students with an excellent educa-
tion in computer science,* the student prone to mischief or
maliciousness has virtually free access to terminals and com-
puter capability. This has all the makings of a first-class
threat which follows none of the logic of economics, knows no
business morals, and due to the vast leased communication net-
works and the availability of WATS lines, leaves no company
truly immune. It is generally recognized that organized crime
has the intelligence and the resources to penetrate almost
anywhere they choose. The advanced college student presents
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a similar threat. He has the intelligence, he has the time,
he doesn't mind working strange schedules, he has access to
terminals, to communications, to computers for decrypting,
and, if his interest does not wane, he can put together a team
sufficiently talented to constitute a major threat to most
industrial systems.
Education plays a]arge part in developing secure systems
of the future, if vulnerabilities are not identified solutions
will not be developed. However, college students given large
leeway in fiddling with computers are not necessarily learning
the basics of computer operations in the way that we would
prefer.
Donn Parker, the nations leading expert on computer crime,
who works at the Stanford Research Center, says that we are
creating new generations of computer criminals by encouraging
our university students to play with computers and teaching
them that it's a game. The games turn serious when the stu-
dents get out in the business world and probe security measures
designed to protect personal information or comapny secrets
stored in the computers. Susan Nycum, a San Francisco attorney
who specializes in computer abuse, states that there is a
feeling that anything the person can get hold of i.e. the pro-
grams, the computer time, etc., belongs to them. There seems
to be no feeling that these things belong to someone else, or
that they have any value. In most computer science courses
the students are poorly supervised. Students are praised and
rewarded for their ingenuity rather than disciplined for various
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forms of computer abuse. Most computer science programs at
universities do not treat the ethics of computer abuse in a
serious manner
.
Management must be prepared to deal with the dishonest
employee who steals time, currently there is a wide variation
of what is considered acceptable. /Ref . 5 4/ Prosecution is
nearly impossible for employees who steal company computer
time for their own personal projects, time that on a larger
computer system is valued at many dollars per second. Few
judges understand computer systems, and Florida is the only
state with a law specifically making it a crime to steal
computer time.
Prior to implementing policies designed to create a secure
environment, management must convince each person in the or-
ganization that there is a problem, that something can be done
about it, and that it is advantageous to do so. For a policy
to be effective, it must have a firm commitment by management,
complete support by every employee, and it must be supported
by trained and competant personnel.
Personnel security problems can range from key-punch and
terminal operator errors to destruction of files by mishand-
ling storage media. Ignorance, apathy, and boredom can be as
dangerous as intentional dishonesty, but still malicious
employees are the most difficult problem for the security
manager to cope with. Through carelessness or in anger, an
employee can inflict severe damage to computer installations
by damaging its program or data libraries. For this reason,
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dismissed employees must be denied access to the machine room
immediately.
Personnel who have access must be suitably screened so that
there is a reasonable expectation of ethical operations. All
employees must receive some level of background check to assure
their personal integrity. There is a need for evaluation and
monitoring of the emotional stability of technical personnel
on an on-going basis. Few employees in data processing organi-
zations understand the extent of the trust placed in them and
their security responsibilities.
Employees critically engaged in the processing or handling
of sensitive or privileged information should be bonded, li-
censed, and/or certified. In considering the serious problem
of employee disaffection: it must be understood that personnel
are basically profession oriented rather than company oriented.
Oaths of loyalty and nondisclosure should be embedded in con-
tractual agreements for all employees. Employees engaged in
the handling or processing of sensitive or privileged informa-
tion should be familiar with and adhere to established codes of
ethics. The assumption must be made that not everyone can be
trusted. System security should depend on the integrity of
as few people as possible.
The ultimate goal of security and protection of confiden-
tiality is to reduce to a minimum the number of people in whom
we must put complete trust and faith. No system of protection
can be made absolutely immune to the subversion or deliberate
disloyalty of personnel, but if the security procedures are
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sufficiently dynamic and sophisticated, the effects of defec-
tion, sabotage, and unauthorized disclosure can be minimized.
In the final analysis it must be recognized that the integrity
of any security program depends on the integrity of the people




In addition to threats from natural acts, and accidental
damage, the data processing manager should spend much of his
time preventing the threats via software misuse or unauthorized
changes. The most common and the most difficult problem in the
computer security business is in the area of software. Stricter
security measures are needed badly in software development and
application. Software can be copied and sold and the copier
is almost guaranteed immunity from any legal action since the
original never disappears. Competitors sometimes hire pro-
grammers on the hope that even if the programmers will not
bring any software with them, they will at least bring all the
software ideas. Present computer designs provide for some
protection from the accidental losses, yet little or no pro-
tection is built in to prevent deliberate attempts to abuse
the system by misuse of it's software. Such threats result
from an attempt to enter the system so as to molest data or
programs, to remove data or programs from the system, to gain
free use of the system or to degrade the system in some manner.
Most penetration efforts via software have been completed
successfully with about two man-months of effort. /Ref. 48_7
The bulk of the effort is directed toward finding information
to be exploited and building programs to retrieve it. Develop-
ment of the basic approaches that assure successful penetra-
tion has usually required only a man-week or tv/o.
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A. SOFTWARE SECURITY WEAKNESSES
In order to understand the problems of providing software
security it is necessary to understand some of the hardware
and software features of the machine. It becomes quite easy
for someone who knows the operating system that controls the
flow of programs and data to steal information. A typical
time-sharing user only needs to know some of the checks main-
tained in the operating system to violate the integrity of the
system. Since the operating system links the applications
program of the users to the hardware of the computer all a
user needs to gain access is the password and identity of one
of the legitimate users. By expanding his list of passwords
he may extend his operating bounds to include all the files
of the system. The common term for this abuse is called "mas-
querading" . The threat of masquerading may be minimized by
careful handling of passwords, and some care of the selection
of passwords. The selection of common names for passwords
should be avoided for obvious reasons. The inadequacies of
passwords have been noted many times. Passwords simple enough
to be easily remembered are usually also easy to compromise.
A good practice is to change passwords frequently, but this is
rarely done because it is considered inconvenient and unneces-
sary. However, passwords are the most workable procedure we
have now, the latter procedure must be followed if they are
to be made a secure procedure.
A clever subverter can get total access to the system by
by-passing passwords and taking control of the operating
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system. If he can find a fault in the operating system, called
"trapdoors", the pehetrator is relatively safe from detection.
"Trap Doors" are sometimes specially planted entry points by
support personnel to obtain data via unauthorized access, and
future subversion. Another effective penetration method is
called the "Piggy Back" method which involves manipulating
messages between the user and the computer, or by cancelling
a user's signoff and continuing to operate under his password
and authorization.
The "Trojan Horse" class of attack is used in an attempt
to achieve the breakdown in security by introducing into the
operating system programs with security holes. Imbedding dor-
mant subversive subprograms inside valid programs is typically
referred to as a "Trojan Horse" attack. Only a particular
condition, such as an alert or activating a special trap door
in the operating system will trigger them. This makes it pos-
sible for the saboteur to influence the system and its resour-
ces even when he is far removed from the situation. If effec-
tively designed this threat could pose a serious threat to
tactical weapons systems. For this reason programs and hard-
ware for weapons are exhaustively tested during the development
stage. Testing and controlling a weapons system computer is
comparatively easier than testing and controlling a general
purpose computer because the operating system is smaller,
easier to audit, less accessible to outsiders and unauthorized
insiders. Data processing managers must establish firm pro-
cedures for reviewing and approving "Patches" or program
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changes, and access to the object modules must be closely
controlled.
The reduction of software failures is a key problem facing
computer scientists. It must be expected that programs ( of
any significant size) will have errors in them. The advent of
the loosely defined concept of "structured programming" has
done much to make software more reliable. The main underlying
concept behind structured programming is to enhance human
readability of computer programs . The enhancement of human
readability of programs can have a beneficial effect on creat-
ing, debugging, and maintaining programs. Structured pro-
gramming is the construction of entire programs with a series
of relatively small modules. Each module should perform a very
limited function. The interface between modules are managed
by passing parameters. Software reliability, that is reducing
the chance of software errors, is enhanced by making modules
"suspicious" of the parameters passed to it by other modules.
The receiving module can run checks to insure that the para-
meters received are within valid ranges. While the receiving
module cannot insure that the parameter is entirely correct,
it can send an error message and avoid improper file main-
tenance if the parameters are not within proper ranges.
Software dealing with file maintenance can also check the
validity of output directed to a file. Once again, the correc-
tness can probably not be verified, but an output outside of
a valid range can be prevented. Particularly sensitive object
modules should be verified periodically. Assuming that a
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standard, approved source program remains available, the source
program should be recompiled and the resultant object code put
in a file. The new object module and the old object module
can then be fed through a text-matching program. The two
modules should match; if they don't, the matter should be in-
vestigated. Some security is provided by the fact that tam-
pering or alterations with object programs of third generation
software is very difficult. If good dicipline is maintained,
tampering could only be done by an operator, or an operator
in collusion with a systems analyst or programmer.
B. OPERATING SYSTEMS
Security weaknesses, from simple to sophisticated, exist
within current operating systems. And the possibility of
designing a totally secure software operating system into
existing hardware is not realistic and would be extremely
costly. Therefore, more reliable program design, acceptance
testing and standards is an alternative approach. /Ref . 16_7
When most operating systems were designed, security was not a
primary consideration, and now identification and enumeration
of security weaknesses is generally difficult and too expensive.
A compromise directed towards providing an acceptable level
of security in a current operating system is to add security
enhancements to the operating system. However, this is no
small problem. Weakness may exist in an operating system be-
cause of errors in logic and coding errors. The correction
of such a weakness requires checking all interfaces between
the user program and the operating system.
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In a study conducted by the Government. Accounting Office,
the following software problems were researched. They are
quoted as possible areas of improvement for a more effective
control in implementing acceptable privacy/security programs.
1. Adequate communication between the parties to soft-
ware design.
2. Incorrect perceptions of the nature of actual trans-
actions to be processed.
3. Time constraints hampering the effectiveness of the
design process.
4. Absence of written criteria or guidelines for designers
to follow.
5. Lack of expertise and experience of programmers.
6. Undetected changes in circumstances making the appli-
cations obsolete.
7. State-of-the-art of program testing which prevents
testing all possible conditions. Certain solutions have been
proposed to assist in the elimination of these sources of
error. But mainly one must recognize the completely error-
free software cannot be designed; however, the probability of
inaccurate documentation can be reduced through implementation
of applicable procedures.
C. SOFTWARE SECURITY MEASURES
The following steps should be incorporated into operating
procedures to enhance software security:
1. Programmers should not be allowed in the computer rocm.




3. No program should be allowed to operate on live data
until documentation is complete and checked.
4. Access to the system must be rigidly controlled and
enforced.
5. Each user and process must be isolated from all other
programs in the system. Hardware .boundry registers, software
address traps and various system states should be present.
6. All requests for data access should pass through a
system routine which mediates address requests and passes them
to the supervisor as a call.
7. Passwords or lockwords should be assignable at least
to the file level.
8
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Precautions should be taken to prevent the insertion
of instructions into programs that might perpetrate a fraud
or cause damage.
9. Provide for recovery procedures and restarts.
10. Make sure documentaiton is complete and properly stored
11. Use file scrambling techniques in real-time systems.
D. CHECKPOINTS AND JOURNALS
Various hardware and software techniques can be used within
the system to detect and correct some types of errors before
they can adversely effect files. Check sums can be used within
hardware to confirm the accuracy of computations or data mani-
pulations. Within the area of data communications, between
processors or between terminals and processors, there are
various types of codes that can be employed to detect and
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correct errors in bits during the transmission (hamming codes
or various polynomial codes)
.
In using checkpoints, the system notes the state of pro-
cessing at that particular point. The values of certain var-
iables and registers are recorded before proceeding. Should
system failure occur after a checkpoint, it is necessary only
to restart the processing at the last checkpoint, rather than
at the beginning of the entire procedure. Recovery; however,
requires one additional factor, a knowledge of what trans-
actions had been processed when the failure occurred. The
aforementioned use of checkpoints alone will not, in general,
accomplish that.
In batch operations, it is relatively easy to reconstruct
all the transactions that were to have been made, but not
necessarily those that had already been made. In an on-line
environment, the operator may or may not have recorded the
entries made at the terminal and may or may not have entered
the transactions intended. These problems can be overcome by
use of a "journal". Journals can be of varying complexity.
The simplest form of a journal records input transactions on
a file as they are entered.
E. SOFTWARE PERFORMANCE
The most sophisticated software problem is measuring the
conformance of user created application programs to their
functional specifications. The vital security question is
not whether it does this much, but rather, does it do more
than you told the programmer it was supposed to do. Has the
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developer of the program, either inadvertently or by design,
added to the functional capabilities of the final product
features which represent a threat to the integrity of your
installation or your data files. /Ref. 4 8/ The manager often
has no recourse but to place the program in service and hope
that six months or a year later he does not discover at great
expense to his company that the program has all the while been
creating a financial nest egg for the programmer. It is an
easy task for' a programmer to imbed within a legitimate appli-
cation a self-serving subroutine, or to plant disruptive faults
which may be triggered by chance events cognizable by the pro-
gram, occurring months after he has left the installation or
quit the company. What is needed to combat this threat are
accountants and auditors who know how to apply their trade to
the automatic data processing field.
F. SOFTWARE SECURITY CONTROL SYSTEMS
In addition to the direct elimination of common security
weaknesses within an operating system, it may also be feasible
to add a security control system. A security control system
could be built around partitioning schemes, classifications,
run-time assignments and general security rules. The par-
titioning scheme within the security control system isolates
the user from information by both classifications and "per-
missions". Classifications could be either hierarchical or
mutually exclusive. All information within the operating
system should be required to have a classification such as
confidential, secret, or top secret, Permissions partition
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users within the operating system from system functions based
on a set of permissions defined for each user. To be fully
effective, the control system would have to define classifi-
cations and permissions for the user, terminal and the system.
The total security control system concept is predicated on in-
dividual accountability. The process requires a Security
Manager specifying the classifications and permissions auth-
orized for each user.
The security control system requires that all communica-
tion end-points (terminals) be known to the operating system.
The data processing manager specifies the classifications and
permissions authorized for each terminal in the network.
The control system requires that the system environment
be defined. That is, the data processing manager specifies
the classifications and permissions valid for the system.
When the system is defined, any classifications or permissions
not included in this definition become unusable for the period
of definition.
Thus the assignment of classifications and permissions con-
siders not only those classifications and permissions valid
for the user, but those valid for the terminal at which the
user is located, and those valid for the system.
The security rules are designed to enforce security within
the operating system. The rules must govern access to infor-
mation, transmission of information, access to a user process,
creation of a user process, and access to a system function.
For example, a user is granted access to information if the
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classification of that information is an element of the user's
authorized classifications. A user is allowed to transmit in-
formation to a terminal if the classification of that infor-
mation is an element of the terminal's classification.
G. SUMMARY
A significant part of the total software security problem
is adequate definition and control of system documentation.
As a result security is improved by limiting each user's know-
ledge of the system on a need-to-know basis. Some devices for
insuring protection include memory protection schemes such as
relocation and segmentation, and paging and memory keys which
allow limited access i.e. read-only. However, computer archi-
tecture is not designed to fully eliminate the ability to ob-
tain access to data through unauthorized methods. The minimum
desired protection should be that any attack, successful or
not, be detected. A data processing manager's biggest fear
should be that a successful or unsuccessful attack may leave




By far the majority of information collected in government
espionage is by interception of data electromagnetically by
the use of wire taps, bugs and by monitoring electromagnetic
emanations. Techniques, counter-measures and counter-counter
measures used in electronic espionage form an expansive pro-
fessional body of knowledge. Its full coverage is not within
the scope of this paper; however, any treatment of data pro-
cessing security would not be complete without pointing to
some of the vulnerabilities from this quarter. Generally, it
should be sufficient to state that any information transmitted
over commercially leased lines, privately owned point to point
lines (switched or unswitched) , or over radio waves is subject
to interception and exploitation. This threat from intercep-
tion and exploitation of transmissions and its partial solu-
tion is treated at more length in the section on cryptology.
In addition to the interception threat to transmitted data,
there are local emanation problems the data processing manager
should be aware of for locally processed data. The field
strength of electromagnetic emanations increases in proportion
to the voltage causing them. Thus low voltage equipment such
as a minicomputer's processor will be a less likely source of
risky emantions than a visual display unit where deflection
potentials of thousands of volts may be encountered. The
field strength of electromagnetic emanations likewise increases
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in proportion to the current causing them, and for this reason
high-current devices such as core memories and electromechan-
ical equipment tend to produce more detectible emanations than
low-current devices such as logic circuits.
There are also several unintended conductors in a typical
computer room that can absorb emanated power by inductive
coupling and radiate it in an undesired manner. Among these
are steam pipes; air vents; and raceways, conduit, and cable
troughs. If the raceways, conduits, and cable troughs are not
already grounded for safety they should be grounded to sub-
press undesired emanations.
The danger of undesired "accoustical emanations" from the
mouths of employees is a great deal more serious than the
danger of undesired acoustical emanations from data processing
equipment. That is just one important reason for securing
against such risks as wiretapping, emanation detection, in-
trusion devices, and acoustical emanations from equipment; to





There are some types of security threats that will resist
all the administrative defensive procedures computer users can
normally muster. A network user is helpless to prevent a
snooper from recording or listening in on his data transmissions
A user may find it inconvenient to lock up disk packs, tape
reels, and other removable media containing valuable or sensi-
tive information. To protect against such threats it becomes
essential to employ cryptography, which may not only be the
best solution to protecting data in transit, but may also be
the most cost-effective way to protect stored data as well.
While cryptography is the study of methods to protect data from
unauthorized viewing, cryptanalysis is the technique used to
penetrate encrypted communications and data. /Ref. 2 3/ The
basic challenge in cryptography is to devise an encryption al-
gorithm that will withstand intense cryptanalytic efforts.
Cryptographic devices have been effectively used for de-
cades to automatically encode and decode data on communications
channels. The techniques used have been highly classified
by governments and until recently have seen little use in a
commercial environment. For communication channels, cryto-
graphic techniques are the only known practical method to pre-
vent access to data from radiation interception or wire tapping.
With the expanding use of distributed processing in computer
systems; the classical techniques of personnel security and
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physical security must be augmented by communication security:
the protection of the privacy of information while in trans-
mission. Central to communication security is cryptology
which is the transformation of data into a form which is use-
less to anyone except the intended recipients. The computer
security field is becoming more sophisticated technically, and
the problem is growing. A big part of the problem is the
security of data in transit. With data encryption being the
obvious answer to this portion of the problem, $100 million
dollar-a-year markets are forecast for data encryption equip-
ment by the 1980' s.
The very nature of computerized information systems actually
facilitates its unlawful reproduction and transmission to any-
one with the tools and know-how. But information stored with
scrambling techniques requires sophisticated technology and
complex deciphering systems before decoding can even begin.
Without the proper key unauthorized use is inexpedient and
costly, and the price is raised beyond any reasonable econo-
mical effort to exploit it. Thus a high degree of secrecy at
minimum cost can be achieved through the use of cryptographic
techniques for the protection of sensitive information. While
not foolproof, data encryption can be an effective means of
denying an intruder any benefits from his ill-gotten gains.
Cryptographic techniques can provide an economical method to
increase the security of a system beyond the ability of all
except the most determined enemy with unlimited resources.
Encryption techniques have been studied for a great many
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years, and much effort has been directed toward development of
sophisticated encryption algorithms. Traditional cryptographic
techniques were developed long before the computer was even
thought of, and most of these early techniques are not well
suited to computer operations.
Basically, there are two principal classes of cryptography,
transposition and substitution. /Ref. 2 2/ A transporation
cipher leaves the letters of the plaintext message unchanged,
but the order is rearranged so that the message meaning is con-
cealed within the cipher. In substitution cipher the elements
of the plaintext message keep their relative position, but
they are replaced in the cipher text by other letters or sym-
bols. There are many variations of both transposition and
substitution techniques. Probably the most famous trans-
position technique was the rail system developed and used
during the Civil War. Using the rail system a line of text
is split among multiple parallel lines in various orders as if
the successive lines were on a rail fence, hence the name rail
transposition. The two subclasses of substitution are monal-
phabetic and polyalphabetic . In monalphabetic methods one
letter is substituted for another; it follows that polyal-
phabetic systems, where more than one letter is substituted,
are a bit more difficult to break.
By the fifteenth century an Italian by the name of Alberti
discovered a technique to break into messages enciphered by
both transposition and substitution. /Ref. 53/ The method
was frequency distribution analysis. Once the language was
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known, it was simply a matter of using known frequency distri-
butions of letters to derive the hidden plain from the cipher.
In 1883 Auguste Kerchkoff established the principle that "the
enemy should be assumed to know the encoding technique". The
problem is to conceal the key to the algorithm making it of
sufficient complexity that an intruder will not be able to
determine the key. /Ref. 43_7 The cat and mouse games between
senders of messages and unintended recipients has continued,
and increased with complexity.
A cryptographic method developed in 1917 lends itself well
to use in telecommunications and computers. Gilbert S. Vernam,
an engineer at AT&T devised a means, using the Baudot code to
add a plaintext character to a key character and produce an









The use of this method with key tape loops and random key
generator machines was the beginning of the modern era of
cryptology. Gradually, electronic enciphering systems re-
placed the mechanical methods. The rapid spread of digital
logic has offered many new opportunities to modern crypto
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designers. Modern high speed digital computers are prime
application candidates for cryptography, and some new micro-
processors are already designed as encryption devices. The
repetitive nature of most computer files would be too vulner-
able to cryptanaletic attack if they were encrypted by low-
level techniques; however, even that would still be providing
some protection against the casual snooper. One can conceive
of ultimate solutions using end-to-end encryption with key
generation and forwarding performed automatically by a compu-
ter assigned to the task. It will be several years before
such schemes can be considered a reality in the commercial
world, but much progress has already been made in that direc-
tion in military telecommunications.
There are three approaches to incorporating encryption
into data communications systems; link-by-link, node-by-node,
and end-to-end. /Ref. 4 7/ Link-by-link encryption protects
data between directly communicating nodes. This approach
avoids having to integrate the cryptographic algorithm into
the communication nodes. It can be implemented by using a
pair of cryptographic devices to bracket the line between the
two nodes. Node-by-node encryption is similar to link-by-link
encryption, except that the encryption algorithm is integrated
into software modules or peripheral devices attached to the
nodes. Each link is still protected by a different key. End-
to-end encryption protects messages continuously with the same
key until they arrive at their final destination, no decryption
is performed at any intermediate node. The cryptographic
62

algorithm is integrated into the end nodes, i.e. the CPU or
the front-end-processor. End-to-end encryption appears to be
the most attractive solution for systems having many lines to
protect. Only a node that originates encrypted messages or
is the final destination for encrypted messages requires
cryptographic capability. End-to-end encryption affords greater
security than the other two because it allows messages to re-
main encrypted until reaching their final destination. Link
encryption is probably the method most users will elect to use
in their first encryption applications. This is because it
will be the method which has the minimum impact on hardware
and software in existing systems. If dedicated lines are
used, which is the perferred way, there should be a different
key for each link, and possibly a different key for each direc-
tion of traffic on the same link. Link encryption is adequate
for protecting against wiretapping but in a network it does
not guard against misrouting.
Encryption has been extremely successful in preserving the
security of radio teletype message traffic; however, some pro-
blems need to be solved before it can be applied on a wide
scale to data in computers. /Ref. 4 8/ One of the major ques-
tions to be solved is in which parts of a computer system can
encryption and decryption be performed. Basically, the other
two questions are what protection improvements will encryption
provide and what are its limitations? What is the cost/per-




Encryption can also be extended to providing protection
of data in main storage. For this it will be necessary to
put an encryption device between the central processor unit
and main storage. It will also be necessary to find a means
of handling control information for input and output devices.
The channel programs and data for transfer to unit records
can be left in decoded form in main storage. This means that
the encryption device will have to be turned on and off under
program control. Additional encryption devices can be added
to the input and output controllers to decode the channel
programs and data when necessary. The encryption device can
also be placed in the main storage unit. Keys and control
information would be sent from the central processor unit and
input and output controller at the same time addresses are
sent. Several keys will have to be kept in central processor
unit registers assoicated with registers containing addresses
such as the instruction counter or base registers. These keys
must be loaded and unloaded when the corresponding address
registers are changed. It will be necessary to have tables
of keys in main storage, and these tables will have to be pro-
tected, for this we may not be able to rely on encryption.
A base/bounds protection mechanism, or a lock and key pro-
tection mechanism will probably be necessary.
The most obvious way of providing encryption on a tape
or disk is to install an encryption device on each tape or
disk drive in line with the data path to the recording head.
With everything on the tape or disk in code, the tape or disk
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is protected in case it is stolen, and it is easier to dispose
of when it is not needed any longer. This configuration has
the disadvantage that a large number of encryption devices
are required. The number of encryption devices can be re-
duced by placing the encryption devices in the peripheral con-
trol units instead of in each tape or disk drive. For this
configuration the encryption device must be designed to be
set, enabled, or disabled by the peripheral control unit. This
permits encoding of data which is to be recorded by a peripheral
device, while not encoding peripheral control and status infor-
mation.
A very complicated scheme is necessary when files are
shared on a need-to-know basis. Data is divided up according
to category of information. Each category is assigned to a
different encryption key. Each user is provided with a list
of keys, the keys corresponding to the data he has permission
to access. Transfers should not be encrypted for devices
cleared for the same level of classifications.
If scrambling techniques are to be successfully used for
computers, repetition of the cryptographic keys must be avoided.
The best key system would use a unique key for each record, and
in order to protect files from professional code breakers, it
will be necessary to change all keys periodically. When this
is done all files may have to be copied and recorded using the
new keys. This problem could become enormous using installed
technology. Hopefully, large scale intergration techniques
will solve this encryption problem of stored data.
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We are currently limited by a lack of better, faster en-
cryption techniques, and speedier, less costly circuits. The
main problems to be solved are mainly problems of getting more
out of encryption schemes and devices. A major problem will
be providing master and submaster key capability for distri-
buting need-to-know level information from multi-encoded files.
In most cases, it will be impossible to accomplish encryption
of stored data by seting keys manually. It is estimated that
10 million bits per second encryption devices can be built for
tape and disk applications, but still faster devices are needed
for use between CPU and mainstorage. This too will probably
be accomplished through the continuing development of large
scale integration.
The cost penalty can become excessive for the introduction
of encryption into already existing systems. Here encryption
by itself is not enough to protect a system, but must become
part of a security plan, and this could have best been accom-
plished at the initial design of the system. Dispite the
difficulties in both the design and use of computational type
cryptographic devices needed for computer application, a number
of companies have already announced cryptographic devices for
commercial use. The two leading venders are IBM and Motorola.
The two devices designed by IBM for commercial use are the
38 45 and the 3846. /Ref . 29/
Encryption by itself will not be sufficient to protect a
system, to be effective it must be interfaced with a variety of
other technologies, including physical security, personnel
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security, and electronic shielding protection measures. Cryp-
tographic techniques are not a panacea for file security. For
cryptographic techniques are of no value if other basic pro-
tections are ignored, i.e. if physical security is lax, the
thief will simply steal the key. Additionally, there is only
one kind of algorithm that you can prove mathematically to be
unbreakable, the one time pad. /Ref . 29/ This type of cipher
is a method where the key is used once and discarded. Even
with this algorithm it must be assumed that both the sender
and receiver are trustworthy and adhere to proper procedures.
67

X. MANAGEMENT AND SECURITY
The management of a data processing installation must be
in a position of demonstrating to more senior management that
is has been responsible in protecting resources entrusted to
it. There is a direct conflict in goals between increased
accessibility and good security. Traditionally, security was
achieved by strictly limiting access to data physically. Along
with growing complexity in the computer systems, management
needs to formalize their methodology for conducting the basic
functions of analysis, planning, and implementing security
measures. Much of the methodology exists in the current li-
terature, but not in a connected, comprehensive manner. Non-
the-less, the responsibility for initiating computer security
lies with the manager of the facility. /Ref. 2/ Management
should keep in mind that an organization with a sound security
program is usually an efficient performing organization, and
an organization with a poor security profile is usually in-
efficient, untidy and may have morale problems.
In dealing with the computer security crisis top policy
makers are faced with a growing complexity of desires which
translate into conflicting needs and concerns. /Ref. 2 5/
Various committees have often pointed toward a basic destina-
tion, but the course has yet to be charted. Current policies
and laws are too diverse and unfocused, they are neither coor-
dinated nor comprehensive. In spite of this, management has
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recognized computer security as an area of concern, and the
dash is on to provide a viable computer security program.
There are four basic actions any prospective data processing
manager should contemplate when planning a security program.
1. Plan for networks; they are the wave of the future.
2. Write security into the specifications and initial
design.
3. Install controls in systems from the beginning.
4. Continually assess and audit those controls.
If these actions are accomplished, the goal of simple, iso-
latable, measurable and flexible security controls will be
very much a current possibility.
The Honeywell Corporation recommends and advises computer
users to include the following steps into their systems to
improve security:
1. Involve the executives and managers before new systems
are implemented. Knowledge of the system by all concerned
minimizes the risks and missuse. In the past there has been
insufficient management participation in design, development,
and implementation of new information systems.
2. Assign a system security officer responsible for looking
at the system's security. He can be a full time or part time
security officer depending on the size of the operation.
3. Prosecute all known criminals and abusers of the
system.
4. Remove all suspects from sensitive positions as soon
as they become a suspect.
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5. Enforce the law and administrative regulations of the
organization.
6. Do not overlook minor infractions of security. Always
take positive action to prevent and eliminate reoccurrences.
7. Organize a cooperative system security effort that
involves all concerned.
In many cases an outside concultant can do more to educate
management as to the impact of risks and potential failure of
a computer system and provide normally expected support in
solving some of the security problems. There is one other
pole that needs to be performed, and which can best be per-
formed by the outside management consultant. That is the role
of the system security auditor. To protect the organization
against the compromise of its assets, management should turn
to a knowledgeable outsider for objectively appraising and
testing the adequacy of compliance with security procedures
and contingency plans. Realistically, managment must be
aware that neither resources nor ingenuity expended for pro-
tection can completely protect against all possible threats,
but in most cases, the costs of unauthorized penetration can
be made to exceed the value of the information obtained.
A. THE COMPUTER SECURITY MANAGER
A new profession, envolved in computer security is develop-
ing in automatic data processing. The security problems that
this position has responsibility of solving are relatively new
to most businesses. One of the first responsibilities of the
computer security manager is to define objectives and priority
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areas requiring attention. /Ref. 54/
Specific responsibilities of the security officer in
charge of data processing security might include the following:
1. Recommendations for purchase, testing and maintenance
of fire-resistant cabinets, fire detection and extinguishing
equipment, alarms, etc.
2. Develops written contingency plans for various emer-
gencies and conducts related drills.
3. Reviews software standards from a security point of
view.
4. Advises higher management of security procedures.
5. Monitors adherence to security procedures.
6. Arranges off-site storage of back-up files and pro-
grams .
7. Arranges for back-up computer facilities and conducts
trial runs to insure capatability
.
8. Advises on the purchase of insurance, and advises the
legal department against the insurance company when claims
arise.
9. Provide special training for people who need it, such
as auditors and physical security guards and officers.
Not only do good security practices reduce the possibil-
ities of loss due to natural disasters and fraud, but insur-
ance companies are usually prepared to offer preferential
terms to organizations with realistic and effective security
procedures.
The new security manager should look at existing controls
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and procedures and rectify any errors or update such policies
that require revision. He must evaluate the level of security
needed to minimize the potential risk outlined in the plan.
He must realize the primary objective is to assist higher
management evaluate security problems and implement necessary
security standards. The following steps are suggested for
developing a comprehensive security program:
1. Identify what needs to be protected.
2. List threats that are likely to occur at your computer
facility
.
3. Perform a risk analysis.
4. Use the analysis in security planning to justify
needed security measures.
5. Develop contingency plans for high risk areas.
6. Repeat this process periodically and analyze trends.
The security manager should remember that security is a
line responsibility and line management is accountable for
the protection of assets in their custody or under their con-
trol. So, to convince management to underwrite security pro-
jects or programs, educate them so they develop an awareness
of magnitude and complexity of the problems and place the




Risk analysis involves the examination of each possible
undesirable situation and a determination of the possible
dollar impact of each situation. The objective is to arrive
at a statement of risk in cost per unit time, such as dollars
per year. This will be matched against the security budget
to see how much will be spent on which vulnerability. Risk
analysis which can be used as a justification for security
plans for any particular environment has received a lot of
attention recently. The General Accounting Office has re-
commended the establishment of "risk management" techniques
within the federal government. /Ref . 16/
Unlike the typical risk situation where the value of the
potential loss is usually obvious, the loss potential asso-
ciated with a computer system can only be determined through
a systematic and comprehensive quantitative assessment of the
risk. The level of risk is acceptable when the frequency with
which it occurs times the loss per frequency is so small as to
be considered not meaningful to the overall operation.
In performing risk analysis, it is important to note the
value of the contents of the typical office will be in the
range of $10 per square foot, the same value for a computer
room might be as high as $2,000 per square foot. Therefore,
security measures should not only focus on the areas of great-
est need but consider value disparity of assets. It is most
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important to be able to identify the risk in relation to the
probability of it occurring. Risk analysis can also determine
your company's exposure from down-times. Once the potential
losses are known, intelligent decisions can be made regarding
the expenditures the organization is willing to tolerate in
preparing to avoid down-time.
The first step that must always be taken is to determine
a complete list of threat types. /Ref . 4 8/ The second step
involves determining probabilities that these threats will
occur. If we list in decreasing probability things that cause
loss or damage to data or data systems we would find at the
top of the list errors and ommissions. Second would be dis-
honest employees, and third is fire. Fourth on the priority
list is disgruntled employees. Fifth is water damage and
finally in last place and accounting for a very small percen-
tage of the losses is loss due to "other causes". This in-
cludes penetration of the data systems by strangers. To for-
mulate the most effective security program it is necessary to
avoid the human tendency to consider things which might happen
but which have a low probability of occurrence. There will
also be a natural tendency to avoid any precaution that might
impose considerable cost or inconvenience on the data pro-
cessing facility. It is natural to imagine a much wider array
of malicious activities which one can reasonably anticipate
happening. Concerns should be reserved for those things which
happen with a sufficiently high probability to justify correc-




After the analyst enters the threat probability and cost
estimates, calculations of the expected annual dollar losses
are made. This is done by multiplying the dollar loss for
each threat times either the probability of occurrence, or
the annual expected occurrences, which ever is appropriate
for that threat. These calculations generate both high and
low expected annual dollar losses for each threat. When to-
taled over all threats, the results provide the best case and
worst case yearly forecast of dollar losses to the company.
One does not have to be a graduate statistician or accoun-
tant to prepare a risk analysis. The process of obtaining the
data and performing the simple calculations is no more complex
than other management decision processes. The result of a
risk analysis is a table of numbers which identify; threats,
cost of threat occurrence, probability of occurrence and finally
the expected dollar cost to the company.
An example of how to do a risk analysis is presented in
Table I which shows four major hazard areas: computer facility,
hardware, software, and personnel. /Ref. 16/ For each area
the significant system threats are listed, and each threat has
been evaluated in terms of the minimum/maximum dollar losses
to the company. The analysis provides a probability of
occurence for each threat.
Much of the probability data needed can be obtained from
outside sources. Many federal, state, and local agencies can
provide the probability that natural disasters will occur in
















MIN MAX LOW HIGH
1. Computer Facility Hazards
Natural Disasters
Earthquake 10 - 3,000 0.1 $ 10 $3,000
Windstorm 2 - 400 0.4 8 1,600
Flood 1 - 100 0.1 1 100
Lightning 1 - 50 0.1 1 50
Rain & Mud 2 - 50 0.9 18 450
Ice & Snow 1 - 10 0.1 1 10
Physical Hazards
Fire 10 - 3,000 0.6 60 18,000
Loss of Utilities 2 - 200 5.0 100 10,000
Air Conditioning Failure 5 - 100 2.0 100 2,000
Communications Loss 1 - 300 12.0 120 36,000
Explosions 10 - 100 0.1 10 1,000
Water Damage 5 - 500 0.3 15 1,500
Industrial Accident 20 - 500 3.0 600 15,000
2. Losses Caused By Hardware
Central Processor 1 - 10 3 3 ,000 30,000
Peripheral Units - 1 20 20,000
Communication Processor 0. 1 - 3 5 500 15,000
Graphics Equipment 0.1 - .5 8 800 4,000
Terminals - .1 20 2,000
Data Collection Hardware 1 - 3 4 4 ,000 12,000






















































the probability of fires, and industrial accidents. Other out-
side sources are computer vendors, universities, and law en-
forcement agencies. Already much data regarding the probabil-
ity of occurrence of computer security problems has been pub-
lished in books and security journals. Donn Parker at the
Stanford Research Institute also collects records of security
threats. Based on his data, prior probability estimates and
cost estimates for many security threats will become easier to
establish.
Some key questions you might want to consider when perfor-
ming a risk analysis are:
1. Which of your data processing assets are the most val-
uable to you?
2. How valuable are they? Or what would the effect be on
your organization if they suddenly were not there?
3. What hazards threaten each of these assets?
4. How do you select protective measures? Or how much
should be spent to protect the assets?
5. How can you determine the residual risk once a number
of protective measures have been implemented?
The analyst will soon realize that it is not possible to pro-
vide absolutely accurate probabilities and costs, and because
of this, many worry about the usefulness of risk analysis.
Quantification of risks and costs is a process of estimation,
always involving inaccuracies, and is no different than any
other fact finding process. But even using data based on an
estimation process, risk analysis provides a means of ordering
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the relative importance of various threats. This gives manage-
ment better perspective of the overall situation, and it cer-
tainly better than doing nothing at all. Frequently, the key
to success lies in the ability to recognize and quantify the
elements of risk so that we are able to deal with them in an
objective way.
A risk analysis provides an approach managers can easily
implement and use. By systematically applying the risk analy-
sis approach, managers of data processing centers can gain a
better understanding of their total security picture: vul-
nerabilities, costs, and trends. With this better understanding,
managers can initiate actions to reduce the costs and risk
associated with the company's computer investment, and thus
fulfill one of their major responsibilities. Finally, risk
analysis encourages managers to establish policies which re-
quire the orderly recording of problem and failure data. Risk
analysis does not have to be expensive, and if diligently
applied can provide substantial benefits to the organization.
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XII. DATA PROCESSING AUDITING
Basically, data processing auditing is evaluating security
measures, identifying areas of exposure and recommending cor-
rective actions. The creation of an audition process by which
the adequacy of procedures and compliance to procedures are
routinely assessed is a large task. However, data processing
auditing could provide immediate warnings of illegal system
penetration. Qualified data processing auditors who are inde-
pendent of designers and users should review the system design
prior to coding and testing. A review of the operation of
these applications should also be conducted shortly after im-
plementation.
It is significant that most cases of computer abuse have




4 8/ Currently, there is no unifying audit
techniques or technology beyond dealing with the most rudi-
mentary batch-oriented systems . Yet much computer abuse could
be avoided with even simple, rudimentary attention to audit
details such as internal controls for validity checks, error
handling procedures, control totals, accounting for computer
time and spot verification of computer output. For these
reasons, the internal auditor needs to play a larger role in
the data processing part of the agency or business. There is
a lack of awareness among auditors to the vulnerabilities of
data in computers. There is a definite need to develop and
80

document practices and procedures for auditors in data pro-
cessing environments.
Auditors should ensure that the simple, inexpensive, but
effective security measures are taken before they worry about
more elaborate measures to protect other, but equally vulner-
able situations. The estimated loss expectancy discussed in
the previous chapter, provides a gauge for determining a rea-
sonable level of expenditure for protective measures. The
security audit program should draw on the risk analysis to
identify the areas which require the most attention.
The role of the auditor is vitally important to the se-
curity of the system. He should work with the data security
manager to spot check and subject the system to accuracy and
validity checks. Auditors must be trained to recognize creative
fraud, and new fraud activities from both inside and outside
the organization.
Upon concluding an audit, the auditor signs his name to a
statement which says in affect, this system is secure within
the bounds established in the design concept and determined




Even though the computer has been in the mainstream of busi-
ness for two decades, some types of data processing insurance
are not routine. Insurance companies are generally inexperi-
enced with data processing insurance. They are reluctant to in-
sure remote terminals, communications cost or switch gear mainly
because they do not understand the technicalities involved.
Most insurance underwriters never heard of a data base on-
line files which might require several hundred thousand dollars
to rebuild and rebalance. Insurance companies consider data
processing insurance by itself a bad business venture. They
prefer to include data processing as part of a total business
package. When you do find an insurance company that does
write data processing insurance, most likely he will negotiate
totally with the comptroller for a "blanket policy" and may
not even talk to the data processing manager. Despite this,
the situation is improving and currently there are several types
of data processing insurance currently available in the form of
negotiated agreements. The most popular types are:
1. Equipment and facilities
2. Loss due to business interruption
3. Storage media and its contents
4. Extra expense at a backup site
5. Delay in collecting accounts receivables
6
.
Valuable papers and records
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7. Malpractice, including human errors and omissions
When the data processing manager is not consulted, and the
coverage is negotiated by the comptroller and the insurance
company, the data processing manager must not assume he is
properly covered. To assure himself of adequate data proces-
sing coverage, he should enumerate all files and estimate the
labor and machine time required to " reconstruct each of the
files, and then total up the replacement costs of the data
processing library. Estimates should include the extra expense
likely to be incurred for temporary facilities, machine rental,
overtime on the staff, couriers, etc., so it will be possible
to continue to operate until the move back to the regular faci-
lity. If the operation includes extensive timesharing or other
on-line services, communications costs become very important.
Make sure the extra expense checklist includes telecommunica-
tions expenses or there could be a three-way argument later
between the data processing manager, the comptroller, and the
insurance company.
Ideaiistically , a good manager should manage his risks
down to some reasonable level and then insure himself against
the residual. Once the decision is made to insure against
exposures, then it will be necessary to place a dollar value
to each exposure, and declare that value to the insurance agent,
and pay a percentage of that declaration as a premium for pro-
per coverage.
Some risk situations are essentially uninsurable because
the magnitude of the risk cannot be assessed. For instance, it
would be impossible to assess the value of certain medical
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records, undiscolsed inventions, or military secrets. Insurance
against inadvertent disclosure, data processing errors, or the
acts of malicious employees is difficult to get, and so expen-
sive that when faced with the premiums most data processing
managers would search for ideas to reduce risks using good se-
curity or better procedures.
In summary, enumerate your risks, quantify them, and dis-
cuss a course of risk management with the comptroller annually.
Whenever there is a substantial change in hardware, software,
application or on-line services, estimate how this changes the
insurance risk and promptly inform the comptroller in writing.
Be sure to estimate the number of days of likely operation in
a backup facility in case of a catastrophe. Be aware that, in
some cases, a catastrophe would signal an immediate equipment
upgrade. In such a case, insure the insurance covers depre-
ciated value plus the costs of a crash reprogramming job,






Computers are becoming more and more important in the run-
ning of large organizations, costs are going down, and use is
expanding almost exponentially. This has combined to create a
computer security problem of enormous proportions and it is now
essential for computer installations to have a computer secur-
ity program. For any security program to succeed, it must have
management involvement from the top down. The program should
be implemented and maintained under the direction of a security
administrator
.
There is no excuse for management failure to respect the
value of data entrusted to their care by taking necessary steps
to ensure its protection. Each organization must be considered
unique and management must design a security program tailored
to its own particular requirements. All the preventions and
all the- protection in the world will not stop computer crimes
or abuses. However, leaders and managers who are aware of the
existence of crime can be alert to its occurrence and may be
able to detect it in the early stages to reduce its devastating
effects
.
Develop an education and training program aimed at promoting
security awareness with all data processing associated personnel
Ensure that the installation is checked for electromagnetic
emanations and listening devices (bugs) at least annually. If
at all possible, encrypt any form of communications which leaves
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the computer center. Important documents should be sent via
registered or guard mail. Using these approaches, one can
begin to formulate an acceptable defensive threshold. The
procedures adopted by the installation must avoid making it
easy to violate good practice. Systems security monitoring
and surveillance of the computer organization is necessary to
ensure that the integrity of the existing policies and proce-
dures have not deteriorated. The security manager should be
aware that a determined perpetrator loves to deal with the
checklist mentality, and everything done to stop him is written
down. If he can get a copy of the security plan, it would give
him an almost infinite set of possibilities to choose from in
carrying out his scheme.
Efforts to solve computer security problems are beginning
to match the importance of this weakness with the data pro-
cessing field. However, we are just now beginning to enter the
productive stage in solving the basic problem. AT&T is current-
ly trying to improve telephone security which may even lead to
customer tariffs on security services. /Ref. 2 9/ Eventually,
AT&T may even use public key cryptography to provide a com-
pletely secure phone system. Privacy regulations and pressure
from federal agencies and insurance companies will give impetus
to this trend. Encryption will be used initially to protect
sensitive data during transmission and will be increasingly
applied to some aspects of data storage. Within federal, state
and local governments, data encryption will become mandatory to
protect the confidentiality of sensitive data bases.
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Much effort has been expended in attempts to solve security
problems by retrofitting security modules on data processing
systems already in operation. After millions of dollars worth
of research and too many manhours of effort, it has been proven
repeatedly that retrofitting, while providing more security
than before, is still subject to penetration by a sharp compu-
ter oriented individual or group. An infiltration attempt by
a team from the Rand Corporation against a supposedly very se-
cure system accomplished the following:
1. Listed the contents of a security protected pseudo-
file at a remote terminal.
2. Circumvented the access protection mechanism and pro-
cessed the file directly.
3. Listed the security protected password at a remote
terminal
.
4. Inserted a "trapdoor" for future circumvention.
5. Accomplished all the above undetected.
It is now accepted that the best way to attack the computer
security problem is to design a system of integrated hardware/
software from the ground up. The development of secure sys-
tems will necessitate balancing the many tradeoffs; systems
architecture, hardware design, software design, operational
constraints, and initial cost and ongoing operating costs.
The nature of the problem necessitates careful and objective
selection from among the many alternative solutions that are
available. The problem is sufficiently complex so as to
require inputs from personnel with expertise in systems
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architecture, programming, cryptography, psychology, accounting,
and other specialties. An effective security system must in-
clude the total environment: physical and procedural safeguards
as well as those provided by hardware and software.
Security is not a clearly defined, carefully delineated,
quantifiable objective. It is an assessment of risk, which
involves not only the interplay of hardware and software, but
also physical and administrative controls and a good deal of
awareness on the part of people working with computers.
How much security is needed must be based on cost benefit
analysis. The extent of security measures depends on the assets
to be protected and the perceived risk. Management must remain
aware that no system of security is 100% secure, if a perpe-
trator has enough time, resources, and determination, any sys-
tem can be broken. What the DP manager must do is to raise the
"price" of breaking into the system so it is no longer worth
the perpetrator's effort. The overall data security plan must
be a three-pronged attack on the problem:
1. Minimize the probability of a security incident occur-
ring .
2. Minimize the damage caused by a security incident.
3. Enhance the recovery from the effects of a security
incident.
Finally, to paraphrase a famous saying: "eternal vigilance is
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